An overview of the Iraqi situation after the election

Iraq is often described as a mosaic country because of its many nationalities and religious differences. Racially there are Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans Cheldo Assiryians. On religious basis there are Muslims, Christians, Yesidis, Sabians and a very small number of Jews. Muslims, who form the majority of the population, are divided between the two main sects, Shia and Sunnis. All these nationalities and religions lived peacefully throughout history in Iraq. What some writers mention about the Shii Sunni division and sectarian wars through Iraqi history was in fact wars between Sunni (Ottoman) and Shii (Persian) empires who fought their wars in Iraq in order to dominate it. Whoever won favoured the sect it belonged to and persecuted the other. However this situation was ended by the British occupation which tried to play Sunni-Shii and Arab-Kurdish differences were soon to find that the Iraqis were united in their refusal to the occupation (1920 Revolution) and the attempts to divide them on sectarian and ethnic lines. The system was changed from monarchical (1921-1958) to republican one (1958- ). The most major change in Iraqi history took place in 1968 when the Baath Party seized power through a successful military coup d’état.  From that date the country’s importance and position in the Middle Eastern grew and improved. However the Baath regime involved the country in many wars, first the war against the Kurdish attempts to secure a special status in the country (1969-75), the war with Iran (1980-88), the invasion of Kuwait (1990), the two Gulf wars with the international coalition headed by the US (1991 and 2003). The last one ended in the occupation of Iraq by a coalition of forces headed by the US and Britain. It is worth mentioning that the last one was carried out without the approval of the Security Council of the UN. 

It was clear right from the beginning that the US had carefully planned the occupation of Iraq, yet it had no clear policy of how to rule it afterwards. Some analysts argued that the US occupied Iraq and removed the regime of Saddam Husain for two reasons only: oil and Israel’s security. In another words it intentionally left the country into chaos to end its role as a major power in the Middle East. Its administration in Iraq had no knowledge of the country and took many decision that led to the collapse of the country: the dissolving of the armed forces, the immediate firing of thousand capable Iraqis for being Baathist, the drawing in the US of a divisive constitution, turning a blind eye to the looting and burning of government agencies, banks and museums, and finally leaving the Iraqi borders unguarded while throwing threats to neighboring countries like Iran and Syria, who in turn allowed armed militias and fighters to freely enter Iraq unchecked. Most dangerous decision was the division of the country on sectarian line and depending on quota system to rule Iraq. Immediately after the occupation the main talks were about the Sunni-Shii, Arab-Kurdish struggles and the favouring of one sect over the other. Those who were allowed to take official positions were only the ex-patriots who came with the invasion, mostly Shii and Kurdish elements. When the resistance to these policies and to the occupation erupted it was blamed on the Sunnis, who were excluded, together with national technocrats who opposed the occupation, from any role to play in Iraqi politics. The ruling parties and organisations immediately waged a war of liquidation against their opponents. Iran’s influence was overwhelming with the US forces turning a blind eye until it felt helpless to fight it.

Claiming to introduce democracy to Iraq, the first and second governments (2003-2004), were formed by the US mainly on quota-sectarian lines.  In 2005 the first general election was carried out under its supervision. It was obvious that the US favoured organizations and parties had a better, if not the only chance to win. Only at that time the US realized how overwhelming the Iranian and religious influence were. Nouri al-Maliki, head of al-Dawa religious-sectarian party, became the prime minister. Sectarian killing was at its height during the years of 2005-2007. The new Iraqi institutions were built on sectarian lines. After seven years of occupation and the sectarian government Iraq became the third most corrupt country and the third failing country in the world, around 450 Iraqi scientists were assassinated, unemployment was higher than 50%, about 1/3 of its population are living under the line of poverty, had more than five million orphans, two million widows and around 1.300.000 of its population were killed according to the Lancet statistics in 2007, and about 4500000 people were forced to live in exile.

With this horrifying situation the Iraqis went to the polls again in March 2010, hoping to change things. 62% of those who had the right to vote participated in the elections. But unfortunately after more than two months of the elections the Iraqis are still waiting for their new government to be established.  The winning list were, al-Iraqia list, headed by the Shii-secular, former interim prime minister and Baathist, Ayad Alaawi, won 91 seats in the forthcoming parliament, his rival Nouri al-Maliki, the present prime minister, and head of the State of Law list, which is a mainly Shii gathering led by al-Dawa party of al-Maliki himself, won 89 seats, the National Coalition headed by Amar al-Kakim, another Shii coalition, won 70 seats and the Kurdish Coalition, which included the two main parties headed by Masud Barzani, Jalal al-Talbani, and the Goran list headed by Mr. Noushirwan Mustafa managed to get 43 seats. The Iraqi parliament is consisted of 325 members and each list has to get 50% plus one for any procedural decision, but needs 2/3 of the votes to approve the appointment of the president of the republic, the prime minister and the head of the parliament. It is clear that there was a major shift in the attitude of the Iraqi electors during the last elections. In the first elections the religious-sectarian parties secured a big majority, now their majority is very much reduced. Even the Kurdish parties have lost most of their influence in Iraqi politics.

A crisis had emerged as no single group could form the government. This crisis was increased by the sharp division between the different lists. Alawi, a secular Shii who managed to get the support of most Sunni groups and personalities, is claiming that he has the right to form the cabinet, according to the constitution, which stipulates that the winning list has this right. The present prime minister al-Maliki argues that he and his partners, the National Coalition, are in the majority and they should form the new cabinet, again according to the constitution which stipulates that the biggest bloc in the parliament has the right to form the government.  He also refused to accept the results of the elections before making sure that he will retain his position as a prime minister. This impasse was further complicated when a group inside al-Maliki-al-Kakim coalition, that of the influential religious leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who alone won 40 seats, is refusing to back al-Maliki for a second term. He threatened to leave the coalition if al-Maliki did not drop his nomination. Iran is said to have contained this rift, but no confirmation has come out of al-Sadr himself, although his declaration were softened a bit. Despite this problem it seems the Shii sectarian coalition is going to form the new government, and Alawi stands a very slim chance to be the coming prime minister, while the Kurdish coalition is ready to cooperate with any candidate if he agrees to re-nominate Jalal Talbani as a president. The failure to establish a national unity strong government will usher the return of sectarian violence. There are no signs that this problem is going to be solved easily. This situation is encouraging the involvement of the US administration and other regional powers in the issue. Iran is supporting the Shii lists; Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Jordan are favoring Alawi, while the US is trying to play the role of the balancing power in order to get as much concessions as it could from the candidate who will become a prime minister. Thus there is no indication so far that Iraq is going to have a stable and strong government that could spread peace, rebuild, develop the country and provide the population with the needed services and security.

The absence of a government and the competition between the competing parties increased the violence in the country. Some observers blame that on the inefficient security forces which were established according to sectarian lines. Others accuse the outgoing government of manipulating the violence in order to intimidate its rivals, especially after it barred 518 candidates from participating in the elections; a third group blames the opposition for the escalation of violence because it wants to indicate the weakness and inability of al-Maliki's government. A fourth party is blaming the old Baath Party and al-Qaeda fighters for taking advantage of the vacuum of power. No matter who is to blame, it is obvious that the security situation in Iraq is still very fragile.  Most Iraqis fear that this election will end up with a weak and incapable government, and that they have to wait yet four years until another election takes place according to the constitution.  During this period violence could increase and sectarian violence could strongly return.

The failure to establish a government is also affecting the US plans to withdraw from Iraq. The US could not leave Iraq in such an uncertain situation, which could only confirm and consolidate Iranian influence and domination. Of course no sensible analysts could believe that the US is going to leave Iraq without any presence of its forces. The unannounced plan and strategy is to leave an elite force in about 15 bases around the country that could be able to defend the US strategic and economic achievements, such as the SOFA agreement which gave it the right to return, whenever needed, and to interfere to solve any problem, the Oil law which allowed US oil companies to work in Iraq and the building of the biggest US embassy in the world in Baghdad. A US withdrawal in 2011 without securing the situation in Iraq will endanger these achievements, be detrimental to US interest in the region and the world. It will also endanger the security in the region, threaten the security of Israel and encourage terrorist activities. What the US is more and more worried about is the Iranian increasing influence in Iraq, directly through its own elements and indirectly through its loyal sectarian parties and ruling personalities. A fragile Iraq will also encourage other elements to interfere. While the US could tolerate the interference of some, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, it is very sensitive about the growing Iranian role and that of Syria. It is also alarmed about the role of other elements in Iraq such as al-Qaeda terrorist group.

The Iraqi resistance which was successful in foiling the US strategy in Iraq and the region and forced the US to think of an early exit strategy, is now suffering from deep division between its different components, something that affected its ability to force reconciliation and the formation of national government. The US on the other hand is refusing to drop the failing politicians whom it favoured since the occupation. In the past seven years most neighboring and regional powers were happy to see Iraq weak and embroiled in its internal problems. Some were even encouraging this instability through supporting armed militias. Lately some of them, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, are thinking otherwise. They have fears that Iraqi instability could spill over into their own countries, and are trying to help Iraq regain its sovereignty and national unity.

Under the present situation the future of Iraq looks bleak. Most Iraqis are pessimistic. The only optimistic ones are those participating in the political process. To solve its accumulating problems Iraq needs a national or emergency salvation technocrat government which excludes nobody. So far the US proved unable to spread peace in Iraq and solve the problems it created. The UN is also alienating itself for two reasons: the bombing of its headquarters in Baghdad in 2004, and the objection of the US to it playing a more positive role. It is time for the international community, especially the EU, to take its responsibility to help spreading the culture of peace in Iraq to get it out of this impasse. The question is how ready is the US to accept the help of the international community in boosting peaceful measures in Iraq? The refusal of the US to accept the above alternative means that Iraq will have to wait until its people realize that only through real and not imported democracy, national unity, reconciliation, accepting each other views, disavowing sectarian violence and ending the occupation they could solve their problems.